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SECURITY ASSISTANCE -AN ELEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
In addition, if we can build trust and understanding between the militaries of two neighboring nations, we build trust and understanding between the two nations themselves. Some have said that war is too important to be left to the generals. Preventive defense says peace is too important to be left solely to the politicians.
-Dr. William Perry
Leaders inside the military as well as civilian leaders concerned with national and global defense have echoed Dr. Perry's statement about the importance of security assistance many times. Security assistance programs influence the behaviors of a wide array of potential adversaries and develop the capacity of allies and friendly nations to ensure regional stability. A particular aim of security assistance is to ensure access and interoperability, while expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or prosecute war on U.S. terms. The global security environment is constantly evolving.
Consequently, security assistance planning must adapt to and when necessary reinforce changes in that environment.
In this paper, the author will explore the evolution of security assistance, its objective s, how those objectives should be met, and the risks involved. Lastly, this paper draws some conclusions and presents recommendations concerning the continuance of security assistance as a foreign policy tool.
Background
Examples of one nation supporting another during a time of conflict are found throughout the ages. In the United States, for example, it was the assistance given to the American revolutionary force by the government of France. Today security assistance (SA) is the term used to designate programs that have emerged over the past 50 years to assist in the implementation of the United States National Security Strategy by providing resources to foreign governments. Security assistance is carried out primarily through a joint effort between the For example, President Clinton's 1995 NSS specified the strategic value of security assistance:
Our leadership must stress preventive diplomacy -through such means as support for democracy, economic assistance, overseas military presence, interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries, and involvement in multilateral negotiations in the Middle East and elsewhere -in order to help resolve problems, reduce tensions, and defuse conflicts before they become crises. These measures are a wise investment in our national security because they offer the prospect of resolving problems with the least human and material cost. Our military force must perform three sets of tasks to achieve the military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. These three components of the strategy are peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict preventions, and fighting and winning our Nation's wars. Accomplishing the concepts of overseas presence and power projection. 12 A specific component of the strategy was peacetime engagement, described as, ….a broad range of non-combat activities undertaken by our Armed Forces that demonstrate commitment, improve collective military capabilities, promote democratic ideals, relieve suffering, and enhance regional stability. The elements of peacetime engagement include military-to-military contacts, nation assistance, security assistance, humanitarian operations, counterdrug and counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. 13 In 1997 the formal requirements of the plan increased when a "National Military Strategy of Shape, Respond, Prepare Now -A Military Strategy for a New Era" was formulated to support the "National Security Strategy for a New Century" and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which also specifies the usefulness of security assistance ….The Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests. Our defense efforts help to promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day-today basis in many key regions of the world. To do so, the Department employs a wide variety of means including: forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, and international arms cooperation. Traditionally, U.S. policy objectives are the ends in the ends, ways, and means strategic model. Regarding security assistance these ends have been to promote regional stability, to help friendly countries defend themselves against external and internal threats (deter aggression), to strengthen the economics of those nations, to support democratically-elected governments, to advance U.S. economic interests, to maintain cohesion of our alliances, and to encourage adoption, or at the very least, an understanding of American values, institutions, and polices. In recent years, due to the threat of terrorism within an ever-changing global society, policy objectives have expanded to include access and interoperability with friendly nations, building coalitions, and supporting the U.S industrial base of defense related goods and services.
The security assistance programs themselves are the ways used to achieve U.S. foreign Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated during congressional testimony that "IMET is perhaps our most cost effective security assistance program." 19 It is also important to note that IMET is not limited to schoolhouse instruction but also includes orientation tours within the United States for key foreign officials and training by U.S. military teams inside the foreign country, known as MTT or TAFT. 20 The FMS program provides grants for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training to promote U.S. national security by contributing to regional and global stability, by strengthening military support for democratically elected governments, and containing threats such as terrorism, narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking. These grants enable key allies and friends to improve their defense capabilities, which in turn helps to build and strengthen multilateral coalitions that enable us and our friends to be increasingly interoperable.
The Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) program helps support regional peace support operations. PKO enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations by improving our ability to operate with other nations. The program also helps build capabilities in countries seeking to participate in international peace support missions thereby sharing an international burden to restore and advance regional stability and peace. Increasingly, these countries are not just consumers of assistance but reliable contributors to our global security interests. 
Balance of Ends, Ways, and Means
Are security assistance ends, ways, and means currently in balance? If by balance we mean all parts being equal, then the answer is no. If by balance we mean an arrangement of parts or elements capable of success or ongoing effectiveness, then the answer is yes. It is all in one's perspective. There are aspects of security assistance that work and others that should be re-evaluated. A good way to determine balance is to measure success. The fall of the Soviet Union is a good example of a major security assistance success story. Using security assistance to deter aggression and support containment, the U.S. was able to defeat communism in Central Asia, Europe, Turkey, and Egypt. There are many other success stories:
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan was supported by regional access granted to U.S. military forces. "U.S. defense officials had developed special relationships and U.S.
forces were eminently familiar with both personnel and facilities in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Kazakhstan due to a series of bilateral and multilateral exercises and consultative talks held every year in the region since 1996." 24 Because of training received via security assistance, Egypt was able to send a medical unit to Afghanistan in support of OEF. The Camp David
Accords also led to massive amounts of U.S. security assistance. In essence, security assistance bought the U.S. government an "insurance" policy against a regional conflict and greatly increased prospects for a lasting regional peace. The Palestinian problem persists, but There are also risks in specific programs under the security assistance umbrella. FMS is one example. The U.S. enjoys great technological advantages in weaponry. The FMS program reduces that advantage by allowing other nations to gain access to our technology. In addition, on occasion other nations have been equipped with newer, more advanced equipment than that in the hands of our own forces. It is problematic for U.S. forces to have equipment that can only achieve the latest capabilities through upgrades that must be purchased separately. Consider the M1A2 tank purchases by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and the AH-64 (Apache) helicopter purchases by several 25 Gulf States, both of which were integrated with a faster Fire Control Electronics Unit (FCEU) and air-conditioning, which at the time were options not yet available to our own soldiers. The sale of advanced equipment also poses the risk of losing the technology inherent in that equipment, moreover other nations are becoming very capable of exploiting technological advances, thereby depriving our defense industry of future business and adversely affecting our national economy.
Critics of security assistance claim the pro grams were initially "designed to meet the challenges of the Cold War and decolonization" 26 helicopters." 29 The accusations were not always true but the perception was the U.S. was expending security assistance funds to train and develop personnel who were later becoming leaders of the armed forces of their country and were wrongly using their power to combat domestic opposition. In other words, they were failing to implement democratic principles.
Should the SOA be closed because some graduates have been accused of or committed human rights abuse? No. Since its inception over 50 years ago, the SOA has graduated more than 60,000 students from 21 Latin American countries. Less than one percent of those students were linked to human rights violations, and fewer still have had allegations substantiated against them. 30 Graduates who have committed human rights abuses are individually responsible for their actions. There has never been a link established between training received at the SOA and subsequent human rights abuses by graduates. Since a disturbing number of clergy have committed abuse against children, should our seminaries be closed? How can we hold a school accountable for the moral failure of its graduates? The conduct of some graduates may tarnish an institutions reputation, but in this case, it is irresponsible to blame the institution. This would be like saying Harvard University is accountable for the actions of the Unabomber. 31 
Conclusion
Security assistance does not exist in a vacuum; it involves an intricate network of diplomatic, financial, political, and security issues. Security assistance is an important element of our security preparedness and ultimately our national security strategy depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Our interests are served better if we are not forced to act alone, and if our friends and allies possess the capability to defend themselves and their own interests which often coincide with, or at least complement, our own. Simply said, when our friends and allies are strong, we are strengthened. It is in our interest to help meet threats that could ultimately bring harm to us all. Security assistance promotes shared interests and shared values. Through security assistance programs, Americans, as well as our friends and allies, are engaging with governmental and non-governmental organizations, educational institutions, private companies, students, scientists, and many others. This engagement is helping to form a network of linkages between our society and their societies, a web of linkages and shared values strong enough to withstand the ups and down of bilateral relations in the long run. Even though we may not always agree on the method we are bound by a common cause, a secure global environment, and it is this shared value that security assistance continuously strives to build upon.
Officials involved in security assistance have to be prepared and be willing to re-evaluate and self-evaluate how they do business. The global environment is constantly changing, and these changes directly affect the U.S. national interest and subsequent policy. The United
States has to stay engaged. Recommendations such as closing the School of Americas or terminating assistance because of issues like human rights or nuclear testing may not effectively serve U.S. foreign policy or security assistance goals. We must stay engaged in an effort to uphold human rights and promote understanding between military leaders in our hemisphere and around the world. In the 1990s, as part of a broad effort to protest Pakistan's attempts to build a nuclear bomb, the U.S. cancelled military training for Pakistan's officers. In doing this, we undermined our own efforts and were left without contacts in Pakistan's military leadership when the country admitted for the first time testing a nuclear weapon. Rear Adm.
Craig Quigley, a Pentagon spokesperson, told reporters at a September 2000 briefing "The whole purpose is engagement. You are either involved in a dialogue with the militaries of other nations or you are not…Human beings react well to faces that they have seen before, people with whom they have had a conversation before. The old cliché about an emergency or crisis is not the best time to place that first phone call to a person with whom you've never had any relationship is absolutely true" 32 . Our current and future security is directly related to political and economic freedom around the world so the U.S. has a stake in the success of security assistance as a foreign policy tool. Security assistance is and should remain a key component of the U.S. government in the execution of our national security strategy. Our current policy allows many opportunities to engage other nations. We should stay the course.
Recommendations
Reliance on security assistance as a key component of our national security strategy is essential. Security assistance personnel must continue to promote programs that enhance military-to-military ties. The IMET program is a very effective, low-cost, high-gain program which must be retained and protected. The benefits gained through direct contact with foreign students will far outweigh the other elements of assistance in light of our future focus on democratization, human rights, and military support to civilian authorities. What we must not do is use IMET as a foreign policy sanction tool or as one article said "in short-range carrot and stick diplomacy." 33 IMET should be seen and employed as a long-term way for the military to develop contacts. Another recommendation is to pursue security assistance programs most intensively with those countries that rank highest among U.S. interests. For example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and now Iraq because of their possession of significant petroleum reserves and because of their proximity to Iran and Syria, should benefit from a more expansive security assistance relationship than a country such as Ecuador. The U.S. should still engage countries like Ecuador but the level of engagement would be modest compared to that of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Security assistance FMS programs should no longer provide advance defense systems and services to less developed countries with questionable regimes, but instead focus on ensuring that our principle allies and coalition partners, those who share the burden, have the advanced capabilities they need to prevail. The future does not lie in maximizing sales of defense systems to all willing buyers but rather in focusing on our coalition partners and collaborating with them and the defense industry, to build systems that will achieve interoperability in the field. The challenge is to continue to be innovative and apply new ideas.
The security assistance community must be vigilant for opportunities to continue to upgrade the structure and be responsive to the opportunities, the changing global environment offers us.
